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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In re ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Disciplinary Proceedings 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Robert W. Hughes, Appellant, respectfully petitions 
the Court to reverse the Decision of the Board of Com-
missioners of the Utah State Bar suspending him from 
the practice of law for a period of one year and there-
after until Robert W. Hughes shall reimburse the Utah 
State Bar for the actual expenses incurred by it in con-
nection with the disciplinary proceeding, or in the alter-
native, that the Court modify the Decision by imposing 
in lieu thereof a more appropriate reduced penalty. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Robert W. Hughest is an attorney at law and is a 
member of the Utah State Bar residing in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. His office address is 80 West Louise Avenue, Salt 
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He owned 50% of the stock of Little Dutch Girl 
Bakers, Inc. when it was incorporated in 1971; he was 
also a director, secretary and legal counsel for said com-
pany until the fall of 1972 (Tr. 7, 8). In the early part 
of 1972 the company's capital was increased in order to 
provide additional working capital, and Hughes and the 
other stockholders agreed to reduce their percentage of 
ownership to allow for the additional capital needed 
(Tr.8,9) . 
Initially, the other 50% of the stock was owned by 
Frank Bakker. Hughes and Bakker first became ac-
quainted in 1966 or 1967. They were officers in a bak-
ing company which they operated under the name of 
Bakker's Royal Dutch Cookies. A dispute arose and 
Hughes was discharged from the company in 1968 (Tr. 
118, 119, 120). Subsequently, the company failed. 
The testimony of Bakker and Hughes was in dispute 
as to who solicited who to go back into business together 
in September of 1971 (Tr. 120, 260). However, letters 
from Bakker to Hughes (Ex. D-18, D-19) show that 
Bakker was anxious to associate with Hughes in forming 
the new company, Bakker's Famous Dutch Cookies, which 
subsequently became Little Dutch Boy (Tr. 259, 260). 
Bakker was president of the various companies and be-
came familiar with the business aspects. 
It became necessary to raise $50,000.00 to operate 
the business under the name of Little Dutch Girl, which 
contemplated an infusion of additional capital and the 
operation of a bakery in California. In order to raise 
the money, Hughes agreed to contact friends, some of 
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whom had been investors in the earlier company, Bakker's 
Famous Dutch Cookies. It was necessary for Hughes to 
incur traveling expenses in raising this money. Bakker 
testified that he thought Hughes was raising the funds 
for stock in the company (Tr. 267). This was disputed 
by Hughes (Tr. 35, 55, 128, 133, Ex. D-12). Hughes' 
version is supported by the undisputed evidence of the 
meeting of the Board of Directors of Bakker's Famous 
Dutch Cookies, Inc., on February 4, 1972, which pro-
vided in paragraph 8 that the officers of the company 
were, "authorized to reimburse or to pay to themselves 
for costs incurred or services rendered from funds they 
may generate from the sale of company stock or distri-
bution rights." (Ex. D-10). Hughes was authorized to 
write checks on the company bank account (Ex. D - l l ) 
and did so (P.R. Ex. 4). 
In August of 1972, Hughes received a check for 
$2,000.00 from one Lee Fong, an investor in Little Dutch 
Girl, Inc. (Ex. P.R.-l). This sum was deposited by Hughes 
in his personal bank account and the proceeds used to 
reimburse himself for expenses he had incurred in pro-
moting the company. Hughes testified that he had dis-
cussed using these funds with Bakker in a telephone con-
versation with Bakker (Tr. 34, 35). Bakker said he 
didn't recall the conversation (Tr. 268). Hughes testi-
fied that he had sold his own stock to Fong, which was 
accomplished by a reduction in the number of his shares 
(Tr. 41, 42), which the complainants did not dispute. 
The letter to the Bar Commission signed by Bakker and 
Monson complaining of Hughes' involvement in the Fong 
transaction states, "The justification of expenses may be 
t 
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correct, but the method in which the money was obtained 
we feel to be highly unethical." The evidence was un-
disputed that Hughes had incurred expenses on the com-
pany's behalf in the approximate sum of $4,982.91 (Ex. 
D-12). Bakker and Monson were reimbursed for expenses 
they had incurred in connection with company business 
(Tr.242). 
Discord developed between Bakker, Monson and 
Hughes culminated about October 27, 1972 (Tr. 235) 
when Hughes was discharged as secretary and attorney 
for the company (Tr. 284, D-14). 
In a subsequent meeting of the directors of the com-
pany on November 21, 1972, the objections of the re-
ceiver of Hawkeye assets to any transfer of those assets to 
Little Dutch Girl Bakers, because of Hughes' claim and 
lawsuit were discussed. Monson and Bakker's letter to the 
Bar Commission complaining of Hughes was signed and 
apparently mailed on November 24, 1972 (Ex. D-15), 
three days later. This letter was the first indication to 
Hughes that Bakker had a complaint over the Fong trans-
action. 
Count Two of the Complaint was dismissed. Re-
garding Count Three, the evidence is undisputed that on 
July 9, 1971, Hughes issued a check to Ryberg, McCoy 
and Halgren in the sum of $1,500.00 in payment of a 
client's debt, which was returned as written against "un-
collected funds." The evidence is also undisputed that 
when the check was written, there were sufficient funds 
in Hughes' account to clear the check (Tr. 110, Ex., D-8). 
The check was re-issued and cleared on September 15, 
1971 (Tr. 112). 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
FINDING THAT HUGHES' USE OF THE 
FUNDS RECEIVED FROM FONG WAS DIS-
PUTED BY HIS CLIENT. 
The Decision of the Hearing Officers of the Bar 
Commission is that Hughes violated the provisions of 
Rule III, Canon 9, DR 9-102(A) and (B) (1) and (3), (Tr. 
00021-00025), which reads as follows: 
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Prop-
erty of a Client. 
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law 
firm, other than advances for costs and ex-
penses, shall be deposited in one or more 
identifiable bank accounts maintained in the 
state in which the law office is situated and 
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited therein except as fol-
lows: 
* • * 
(B) A lawyer shall: 
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of 
his funds, securities, or other properties. 
* # # 
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, 
securities, and other properties of a client 
coming into the possession of the lawyer 
and render appropriate accounts to his 
client regarding them. 
* * * 
The Decision states that Hughes violated the fore-
going Canon of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules by applying 
funds of his client to his own use when his right to do so 
S 
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was dispuetd by his client and in failing to maintain said 
funds in an identifiable bank account located in the State 
of Utah; that is, co-mingling his funds with clients' funds, 
in failing to notify his client of the receipt of said funds 
and in not maintaining funds and rendering appropriate 
accounts to his client regarding said funds. 
At the outset there is a question whether Hughes sold 
his own stock or company stock. Granted, there was some 
juggling of the shares of stock owned by the promoters in 
order to have sufficient stock to issue to the investors and 
still comply with the Underwriters requirement as the 
percentage of stock that could be held by the "insiders." 
The evidence is undisputed that the amount of stock 
initially owned by Hughes and the other promoters was 
reduced. Hughes testified that he sold Fong his stock 
(Tr. 41, 42), which was not disputed by the complainants. 
Even if the stock could be considered company stock, 
which isn't clear, the evidence was undisputed that Hughes 
had either actual or implied permission to reimburse him-
self for expenses incurred in promotion of company busi-
ness. He was authorized to write checks on the company 
account. A resolution of the Meeting of the Board of 
Directors on February 4, 1972, authorized he and the 
other officers to pay to themselves for costs incurred or 
rendered from funds generated from the sale of company 
stock or distribution rights. Hughes testified that in a 
telephone conversation with Bakker in which Hughes' 
need for reimbursement of funds for incurred expenses 
was discussed, Bakker suggested he use the funds received 
from Fong. Bakker testified he didn't recall the conver-
sation. ;:-.M-V/-0 .a§^>*v<-\\ 
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There was no attempt to conceal the fact that Fong 
was a stockholder. His name was listed as a stockholder 
in the Reg A application to the S.E.C. and on a stock 
certificate issued to Fong signed by Bakker (Ex. D-20). 
True, Bakker testified that he signed a number of certifi-
cates in blank and was unaware of the sale of stock to 
Fong until his attention was directed to it by Monson (Tr. 
256). 
The evidence is also undisputed that Bakker and 
Monson were reimbursed from company funds for ex-
penses incurred in company business (Tr. 242). Hughes 
spent more time and effort in raising funds and incurred 
more expense than the other principals. 
There is no contention that Hughes' reimbursement 
of himself for expenses was fraudulent (Tr. 135). It is 
significant that no demand was made by complainants 
of Hughes to account for the Fong funds and that Hughes' 
first notice of the complaint was Bakker and Monson's 
letter to the Bar Commission on November 24, 1972, 
which states the justification of the expenses may be cor-
rect, but the method by which the money was obtained was 
unethical. This letter was written after a Meeting of the 
Board of Directors on November 21, 1972, in which 
Hughes' claim for a fee and his objection to transfer of 
Hawkeye assets was discussed. The inference is that the 
letter was motivated by the dispute, and not by a bona 
fide claim against Hughes, 
In this instance, it is conceded that Hughes co-
mingled client funds with his own and did not render an 
appropriate account to the company. 
t 
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Regarding Count Three, the evidence was undisputed 
that Hughes justifiably believed there were sufficient 
funds in his account to cover the check written to Ryberg 
on July 9, 1971, which was returned because of uncollect-
ed funds. A check for the amount was reissued on Sep-
tember 15, 1972, which cleared. Hughes did not maintain 
a separate account for clients' funds which was the only 
ethical violation involved in the Ryberg transaction. 
Charges of unprofessional conduct on the part of an 
attorney should be sustained by convincing proof and to 
a reasonable certainty; any reasonable doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the accused. Brawner v. State of Cali-
fornia, 313 P.2d 1, decided 1957. 
The circumstances in this case should also be con-
sidered in determining whether Hughes violated ethical 
standards in reimbursing himself for expenses incurred 
in discharging his duties as an officer of the company. 
There is no evidence that Hughes violated a fiduciary 
duty to his client. Hughes and the officers were engaged 
in promoting the company as businessmen. Hughes had 
not only represented Bakker as an attorney for a period 
of years, but had participated with him in prior business 
ventures. Bakker attempted to give the impression that 
he was naive and unsophisticated and relied solely on 
Hughes in all transactions involving the company's busi-
ness, a contention frequently made by laymen in disputes 
with lawyers which is not always warranted, and was not 
supported by the evidence in this instance. 
In Smoot v. Lund, 13 U2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962) 
which was an action for fraud and reformation of a con-
tract, the Court said: 
8 
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in a situation such as that found here, where 
the attorney had represented a client, but entered 
into negotiations with him in which it was clearly 
apparent to the latter that the attorney was dealing 
in his own interests, it is neither reasonable nor 
practical to suppose that the attorney will repre-
sent the client's interest to the entire exclusion of 
his own. Nor does the law require it. The plain-
tiffs appear to be intelligent business people and 
they were dealing in a very substantial business 
transaction. There is nothing mysterious or in-
scrutable about this contract. They were able to 
read and understand it and they do not claim to 
the contrary; nor do they allege any concealment 
or deception as to its contents. 
We recognize that the Findings and Decision of the 
Bar Commission are entitled to great weight, and should 
be sustained if reasonably supported by the evidence, and 
we do not contend that the Hearing Officers arrived at 
their decision arbitrarily or capriciously. The Bar Com-
mission decision constitutes recommended punishment 
which may be adopted, modified or rejected by this Court. 
Every case must be judged on its own facts. 
In the following cases in which the charges against 
the attorney were more aggravated than in the case at 
Bar, this Court reduced the time of suspension: 
In Re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302 (1933). Un-
ethical conduct, wilful disobedience in violation of an 
Order of the Court in appropriating a client's money to his 
own use. The Bar Commission recommended suspension 
for six months; the Supreme Court reduced suspension to 
three months. 
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In Re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13. Un-
ethical conduct, solicitation of employment in personal 
injury cases, disobedience of Order of Court to disclose 
whereabouts of an accused person released to his custody, 
gave false testimony under oath The Bar Commission 
recommended two year's suspension; the Supreme Court 
reduced suspension to nine months. 
CONCLUSION 
In essence the evidence shows that Hughes did not 
deposit client funds in a separate identifiable trust account 
which, though a violation of the proscription of the Pro-
fessional Responsibility Code, does not merit one year's 
suspension from the practice of law. Without in any way 
attempting to presume upon the judgment of this Court, 
we submit that the Decision of the Utah Bar Commission 
should be reversed or in the alternative, modified to a 
more appropriate reduced penalty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Rex J. Hanson 
HANSON, WADS WORTH 
& RUSSON 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Robert W. Hughes 
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